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Abstract 
This study investigates bidirectional causality between governance and financial 
development using panel data of 101 countries from 1984 to 2013. The financial 
development–governance nexus is explored using econometric methods robust to 
cross-sectional dependence, and the relationship between different levels of 
development and openness is analyzed. Long-run equation estimates show clear 
evidence that financial development positively affects governance, and this 
positive impact is found to be robust to three different measures of governance. 
Further analysis shows that improving governance quality has positive effects on 
financial development, while Granger causality tests demonstrate bidirectional 
causality between financial development and the governance measures. Last, the 
impact of financial development on governance is dependent on a country’s level 
of development and openness. These findings underscore the crucial role of 
financial development in bringing about good governance reforms and economic 
growth that, in turn, can further develop the financial sector. As such, a symbiotic 
and synergistic relationship can persist between good governance, growth, and 
financial development. The findings provide significant motivation for 
policymakers to encourage openness and financial sector development to lift the 
standard of living, especially in emerging economies. 
Keywords: financial development; governance; cross-sectional dependence; 
economic growth; bidirectional causality; globalization 
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1 Introduction 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of economic growth and 
development underscores the importance of financial development and good governance. Efficient 
financial markets divert resources from unproductive to productive activities, thereby improving 
overall economic efficiency and increasing economic growth. Schumpeter (1911) first highlighted the 
role of financial development and financial markets in the growth process, suggesting an efficient 
banking system is the key to economic growth because of its role in allocating savings to productive 
investments, thus promoting innovation. By contrast, without participatory, transparent, accountable, 
and justice-manifesting institutions, including those that guarantee property rights, policymaking can 
remain paralyzed, constraining countries’ abilities to optimize their economic and human development 
capacity: in short, governance matters. From an institutional perspective, laws and regulations that are 
effectively enforced by an impartial and efficient governance system can support innovation and 
investment and create an environment conducive to inclusive economic growth. 
The dynamic interaction between financial development and governance remains largely 
unexplored. Extant studies focus entirely on exploring the role good governance plays in strengthening 
a country’s financial sector. Financial sector development has been found to occur in the presence of 
an efficient bureaucracy with low levels of corruption and strong law and order (Law & Azman-Saini, 
2012; Le, Kim, & Lee, 2015). La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) explore 
the link between financial development and institutions, focusing on whether differences in legal origin 
can explain capital market development. By contrast, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) 
examine the relative importance of the law and finance and initial endowment hypotheses. Their results 
suggest initial endowments play a more critical role in financial market development than legal origins. 
A related strand of literature explores the interrelationship between country-level corporate 
governance provisions and financial development (Li, Maung, & Wilson, 2018). However, few studies 
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explore the interrelationship between institutional quality and financial development across countries 
(Banerjee, Bose, & Rath, 2019; Miletkov & Wintoki, 2008). A growing number of studies have 
explored causality from governance to financial development, but to the best of our knowledge, reverse 
causality from financial development to governance has not been explored. Several arguments can be 
made to support causality from financial development to governance. For instance, governance 
reforms are often costly; hence, well-developed financial markets can be a prerequisite for successful 
and viable governance reforms (Miletkov & Wintoki, 2008, 2009). It may also be the case that only 
countries with developed financial markets can afford good governance and build better institutions 
(Fergusson, 2006). Furthermore, when political power is unequally distributed, and a narrow elite 
controls political decisions, financial development can be curtailed to restrict political competitors’ 
financial access (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). This suggests improving the level of financial development 
can lead to a higher degree of political competition that can, in turn, improve the quality of institutions 
and governance. 
A causal relationship from financial development to governance can also be motivated using 
North’s institutional change framework (North, 1971, 1981, 2005). According to this framework, new 
institutional and governance structures will emerge when the social benefits of change exceed the 
costs. Thus, any technological shock or change in relative prices alters the cost-benefit possibilities of 
new institutional and governance arrangements, consequently stimulating the demand for new 
institutional and governance arrangements or changes in the existing structures. Changes in financial 
development modify the costs and benefits of particular institutional arrangements (Miletkov & 
Wintoki, 2008). More specifically, improvements in the level of financial development act as a catalyst 
for the emergence of higher quality institutions and governance frameworks. Improvements in 
governance increase the benefits accruing from potential financial arrangements, and after a certain 
threshold, the benefits from governance reforms will exceed the cost of undertaking those reforms.  
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Indirectly, lower financial development levels increase economic volatility and uncertainty 
(Beck, Lundberg, & Majnoni, 2006), which in turn increase the risk of political instability and lead to 
deterioration in governance quality. Similarly, with higher levels of financial development come 
greater financial liberalization and more frequent cross-border transactions (Miletkov & Wintoki, 
2008). Such frequent interactions create a more informed citizenry, making them more aware of their 
legal and political rights and stimulating the demand for better governance structures (Khalid, 2017). 
Further, as Miletkov and Wintoki (2008) highlight, frequent financial transactions create incentives 
for people to acquire specific skills and education that are more conducive to administering and 
enforcing contracts, which, in turn, reduces the cost of administering and implementing governance 
reform. This discussion clearly underscores that financial development is a potential driver of 
improvements in governance structures, a premise that requires an empirical investigation. 
This study builds on cross-country empirical studies that confirm a positive association between 
financial development and institutional quality. A related strand of literature also explores the link 
between financial development and legal origins, while a smaller body of work more specifically 
examines the role of good governance in financial market development. This study adds to this growing 
body of literature by exploring bidirectional causality between financial development and governance; 
it tests whether the relationship between financial development and governance varies by level of 
development and level of openness, which has yet to be considered in the literature. 
In this study, bidirectional causality is tested using panel data of 101 countries from 1984 to 
2013. Governance quality is measured using the International Country Risk Guide’s political risk index 
(GOV) and its two subcomponents, the Investment Profile index (IP) and Government Stability index 
(GS). The financial development (FD) data are collected from Svirydzenka (2016). The financial 
development–governance nexus is then explored using econometric methods robust to cross-sectional 
dependence to identify the models to be cointegrated.  
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When the time dimension in panel datasets is substantially lower than the number of cross-
sections, it is critical to take into account cross-sectional dependence (Sarafidis & Wansbeek, 2012; 
Shafiullah et al., 2019). Moreover, in a globalized world, governance (institutional quality) in one 
country affects others, especially its neighbors (Hosseini & Kaneko, 2013; Stiglitz Joseph, 2010), and 
changes in governance and institutional structures are driven by common global factors (Khalid, 2016). 
Similarly, convergence (as well as spillover, contagion, etc.) in financial development has been 
hypothesized and empirically identified across many economies (Apergis, Christou, & Miller, 2012; 
Bahadir & Valev, 2015; Dekle & Pundit, 2016). These highlight the hypothetical and empirical 
possibility of cross-sectional dependence in our panel dataset. As such, it is essential to implement 
econometric methods that are robust to cross-sectional dependence to obtain unbiased and efficient 
empirical estimates that will allow us to make valid inferences regarding the relationship between 
financial development and governance. Moreover, testing for cointegration in the specified models is 
important, as its presence precludes any question of endogeneity because the estimates of a 
cointegrated system are “superconsistent” (Stock, 1987). Cointegration and causality analysis has been 
used extensively in the literature related to financial development (see, e.g., Ahamada & Coulibaly, 
2013; Coulibaly, 2015; Fromentin, 2017). Thus, our estimation strategy—controlling for cross-
sectional dependence in a cointegration-causality analysis framework—enables us to uncover the 
causal relationship between governance and financial development and identify the direction of 
causality. 
Long-run equation estimates show clear evidence that financial development positively affects 
governance. The positive impact of financial development on governance is found to be robust for 
three different measures of governance, while further analysis shows that governance and investment 
profile index have positive effects on financial development. The Granger causality tests demonstrate 
bidirectional causality between financial development and each governance measure. Last, we find the 
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impact of financial development on governance depends on the level of economic development and 
the country’s economic openness. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical discussion of 
the relationship between financial development and governance and develops the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3 introduces the data and empirical methods. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
results, while Section 5 reports the results of robustness checks. Section 6 offers the conclusions. 
2 Financial Development and Governance: An Overview 
The role of financial development in a country’s economic growth and development has been 
studied extensively in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Extant studies have identified five 
channels through which financial development may affect economic growth and development. First, 
in most theoretical models, the financial system’s allocative efficiency is highlighted as a determinant 
of growth (see, e.g., Bencivenga & Smith, 1991; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Pagano, 1993; Wu, 
Hou, & Cheng, 2010). Second, emphasis is placed on the role of financial markets in providing 
opportunities to hedge against risk by allowing portfolio diversification and increasing liquidity, 
thereby stimulating economic growth (Levine, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1992). Third, financial development 
is seen as a mechanism that provides an exit option for agents and improves the efficiency of financial 
intermediation (Arestis, Demetriades, & Luintel, 2001; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000). Fourth, as 
Greenwood and Smith (1997) suggest, efficient financial markets foster technological progress and act 
as a catalyst for entrepreneurship. Last, efficient financial markets restructure the incentives for 
corporate control that impact economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 1996; Jensen & Murphy, 
1990). 
A growing strand of literature explores the relationship between financial development and 
governance, including the quality of institutions and legal systems. Most notably, studies have shown 
that a legal and regulatory system that guarantees property rights protection and contract enforcement 
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is critical for financial development. For instance, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) focus on whether 
differences in legal origins can explain capital market developments. Their findings show that poor 
shareholder rights are associated with less developed equity markets, especially in countries with 
French civil law. Common law countries enjoy relatively high levels of shareholder rights due to more 
highly developed equity markets. Similarly, better creditor rights also lead to the development of 
financial intermediaries. Beck et al. (2003) explore the relative importance of the law and finance and 
the initial endowment hypotheses. Their results suggest initial endowments play a more critical role in 
financial market development than legal origins. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) highlight the importance of political forces in shaping policies that 
influence financial market development. They argue that in countries where political power is 
unequally distributed and political decisions are controlled by a narrow elite, financial development 
could be curtailed to restrict political competitors’ access to finance. This argument also suggests an 
increased level of financial development can lead to a higher degree of political competition that in 
turn can improve the quality of institutions and governance. The link between political institutions and 
financial development has been further investigated through analyses of the impact of democracy and 
regime change on financial development (Girma & Shortland, 2008; Huang, 2010). Girma and 
Shortland (2008) assess how financial development is affected by democratic characteristics and 
regime change; their findings reveal that the quality of democracy and political stability are substantial 
factors that drive financial development. They analyze this effect on a disaggregated level and find 
that, for the most part, political stability and improved democratic processes benefit the banking sector. 
In fully democratic regimes, there is a swift rise in stock market capitalization (Girma & Shortland, 
2008). Huang (2010) also demonstrates that a democratic transition is typically followed by increased 
financial development and improvement in institutional quality leads to improved financial 
development, at least in the short run. This relationship holds particularly well for lower income 
countries, countries that are ethnically divided, and countries with French legal origins. 
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Roe and Siegel (2011) also highlight the political context of improving financial development, 
arguing that political stability determines a country’s capacity and willingness to reform and improve 
the institutions and regulations that protect investments. Political instability threatens the proper 
functioning of institutions and, as a result, may lead to underdeveloped financial markets. This 
argument is supported by empirical evidence that variations in political stability have a consistent and 
significant effect on debt and stock market development. Haber, North, and Weingast (2008) examine 
the role of politics in financial development in the United States and Mexico from 1790 to 1914 and 
argue that government has strong incentives to behave opportunistically and use financial repression 
for its benefit. However, institutions that foster political competition reduce the likelihood that 
governments will behave opportunistically and result in a larger, more competitive, and more efficient 
banking system. 
Mishkin (2009) argues that globalization is a key factor for stimulating institutional reforms in 
developing countries. Sound institutions are essential for promoting financial development because 
they establish and maintain strong property rights, an effective legal system, and efficient financial 
regulation. Therefore, institutional quality plays an important role in mediating the effect of 
globalization on financial development. Law (2009) demonstrates that trade openness and financial 
openness appear to have positive impacts on financial development in developing countries. He further 
analyzes whether the impacts result from fostering competition or upgrading institutional quality and 
indicates the institutional quality channel outperforms the competition channel. 
Apart from formal institutions and enforcement of property and contractual rights, a related 
strand of the literature analyzes the relationship between informal institutions—in particular, social 
capital based on trust—and financial development. Social capital is represented by the shared norms 
that facilitate cooperation between two or more individuals (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1999; Ostrom, 
2000). Shared norms involve developing trust while disincentivizing cheating. Social capital is highly 
significant in developing markets as financial contracts foster a high level of trust among members of 
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a society (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004). Calderón, Chong, and Galindo (2001) evaluate the 
relationship between social capital and financial development and find trust has an economically 
significant and positive effect on financial intermediaries’ size and activity, commercial banks’ 
efficiency, and the level of development of stock and bond markets. Furthermore, Calderón et al. 
(2001) underscore the complementarity between trust and formal institutions in a society where the 
rule of law is disregarded and vice versa. 
This discussion illustrates the importance of governance and institutional quality in improving 
financial development. However, there may also be reverse causality from financial development to 
governance and the quality of institutions, an issue that has largely remained unexplored in extant 
literature. There are several channels through which financial development can affect the quality of 
governance. Financial development in a country reduces borrowing constraints and increases access 
to finance for most of the population, which, in turn, increases economic and political competition and 
lead to governance improvements. Similarly, financial development is often accompanied by financial 
and trade liberalization, which allow for the free flow of money, goods, and services. As Khalid (2017) 
notes, trade liberalization eventually leads to improvements in institutional quality and governance. 
Moreover, financial liberalization increases pressure on governments to improve their institutional 
structure to prevent the outflow of finance. 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to disentangle the relationship between governance and 
financial development and clearly establish the direction of causality. Moreover, we explore non-
linearities in the relationship by analyzing the underlying relationship for different income and 
globalization levels. 
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3 Model, Data, and Methodology 
3.1  Model and data 
Based on recent literature, the determinants of governance are specified in Eq. (1): 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Here, governance (GOV) for country i in period t is explained by globalization as measured by 
the KOF overall globalization index (KOG), economic development as proxied by real GDP per capita 
(GPC), and financial development (FD) using the financial development index introduced by 
Svirydzenka (2016). The quality of governance in Eq. (1) is measured using a composite index derived 
from the political risk index in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
To further check the robustness of the results estimated from model (1), we substitute the sub-
indices from ICRG’s political risk index—investment profile (IP) and government stability (GS)—for 
GOV and estimate the following two equations: 
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2) 𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑂𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (3) 
Our panel dataset covers 101 countries from 1984 to 2013, and Table 1 provides the descriptive 
statistics of our model variables. As can be seen, GOV has a mean of about 24 and ranges from 5 to 
38. The standard deviation of 6.4475 produces a coefficient of variation of about 26.5 percent. The 
mean of IP is approximately 7.5, with highest and lowest values of 12 and 0, respectively. The standard 
deviation is 2.44, giving us a coefficient of variation of 32.6 percent. In contrast, GS ranges from 1 to 
12, with a mean of 7.65 and a coefficient of variation of 27.6 percent. Judging from the coefficients of 
variation, IP is the most volatile governance measure, followed by GS and GOV. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Variable      
Measure  GOV IP GS KOG GPC FD 
Mean  24.3002 7.4790 7.6508 54.4365 14288.4800 0.3210 
Maximum  38.2900 12.0000 12.0000 92.6300 110001.1000 1.0000 
Minimum  5.0000 0.0000 1.0000 16.1400 130.4367 0.0000 
Standard Deviation  6.4475 2.4400 2.1085 18.2182 18633.9200 0.2392 
Observations  2929 2929 2929 2929 2929 2929 
Time-series range  1984-2013      
No. of countries  101      
 
The KOG has a mean of about 54 and fluctuates between 93 and 16. With a standard deviation 
of slightly over 18, the coefficient of variation is about 33.5 percent. The mean GPC is a little over 
US$14,200, with highest and lowest values of about US$110,000 and US$130, respectively. The 
standard deviation is more than US$18,500, resulting in a coefficient of variation of 130.4 percent. FD 
has a mean of about 0.32, with 1 and 0 being the highest and lowest possible values. Based on the 
standard deviation of 0.24, the coefficient of variation is 74.5 percent. Thus, GPC is the most volatile 
explanatory variable, followed in order by FD and KOG. 
3.2  Empirical strategy 
The literature exploring the inter-relationship between financial development and other factors 
such as trade openness, quality of governance and economic growth and development mainly rely on 
traditional panel data methods such as Fixed effects, Random effects of GMM methods (see, e.g., 
Baltagi, Demetriades, & Law, 2009; Çoban & Topcu, 2013; Law & Azman-Saini, 2012; Law, Tan, & 
Azman-Saini, 2014; Li, Maung, & Wilson, 2018). These techniques, however, provide a biased view 
of the relationship due to the presence of identification issues. Moreover, these studies do not take into 
consideration cross-sectional dependence while exploring the underlying relationship using panel data.  
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Cross-sectional dependence, also known as common correlation, often results in standard panel 
unit root test results that under-reject the null hypothesis. This introduces type II error in the subsequent 
empirical analysis. In addition, testing for cross-sectional dependence is important for two reasons: 
First, in a globalized and highly integrated world, changes in governance and institutional structures 
across countries are driven by common global factors (Khalid, 2016), and changes in governance and 
institutional quality in one country often spill over to others, especially its neighboring countries 
(Hosseini & Kaneko, 2013; Stiglitz Joseph, 2010). Similarly, convergence (as well as spillover, 
contagion, etc.) in financial development has been hypothesized and empirically identified across 
many economies (Apergis et al., 2012; Bahadir & Valev, 2015; Dekle & Pundit, 2016). Second, the 
number of cross-sections (N=101) in the panel dataset described above is considerably higher than the 
number of time-periods (t=30). Cross-sectional dependence is often the characteristic of such panels 
because the error term contains unobserved common factors and shocks (Sarafidis & Wansbeek, 2012; 
De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006; Dogan et al. 2017; Shafiullah et al., 2019). 
Considering the shortcomings of the traditional time-series approaches such as Fixed and random 
effects model and GMM, this study, therefore, employs a cointegration test together with a Granger-
causality test and test for cross-sectional dependence to uncover the causal relationship between 
financial development and governance quality. This approach of testing for causality has been widely 
used in the literature on the determinants and effects of financial development (see, e.g., Ahamada & 
Coulibaly, 2013; Coulibaly, 2015; Fromentin, 2017; Ahmad, Jabeen, Hayat, Khan, & Qamar, 2020; 
Ali, Yusop, Kaliappan, & Chin, 2020). Because the causal link between financial development and 
governance is likely to be bidirectional, traditional methods will provide biased estimates of the 
relationship. To preclude any question of endogeneity, we test for cointegration in the specified models 
because the estimates of a cointegrated system are “superconsistent” (Stock, 1987). We also test for 
cross-sectional dependence in our dataset. We implement several tests based on the Lagrange 
multiplier, including Breusch and Pagan (1980), Pesaran (2004), and Baltagi, Feng, and Kao (2012), 
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as well as one test based on the Dickey-Fuller procedure (Pesaran. 2004). These four techniques test 
for cross-sectional dependence in individual variables. In addition, it is often useful to test for cross-
sectional dependence in the specified model. To achieve this, the Frees (1995) and Pesaran (2004) 
procedures can be implemented for models (1-3). If cross-sectional dependence is diagnosed in the 
model variables, standard unit root tests cannot be used to ascertain their stationarity properties. To 
that end, Pesaran (2007) derived a variant of the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test that can account for 
dependence across cross-sections, a procedure is known as the CIPS test. 
If the CIPS test indicates the model variables are nonstationary, we are required to test for any 
presence of cointegration (or long-run equilibrium). If the panel dataset shows cross-sectional 
dependence, it is necessary to apply cointegration testing methods that are robust to common 
correlation. The Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) panel cointegration testing procedure is one of the 
few methods capable of doing this. In addition, it is known for its robustness to residual 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, as well as good finite sample performance. This procedure is a 
Lagrange multiplier-based test and estimates the following two statistics: 
𝑍𝑗(𝑁):= √𝑁 (𝐿𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗(𝑁) − 𝐸(𝐵𝑗)),    for     𝑗 = {𝜙, 𝜏} (4) 
 
where 
𝐿𝑀̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗(𝑁) ≔ 1𝑁∑ 𝐿𝑀𝑗(𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 ,     for     𝑖 = {1,… ,𝑁} (5) 
 
and the Lagrange multiplier statistic is given by LMj. 
The empirical analysis then requires estimating long-run equations based on models (1-3) if 
they are found to be cointegrated. The presence of cross-sectional dependence in the panel dataset 
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requires implementing a suitable regression method. The Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects 
(CCE) mean group estimator accounts for cross-sectional dependence (or common correlation) by 
incorporating unobserved common factors in the estimation process. The CCE approach estimates 
coefficients for each cross-section and averages them across the panel using appropriate weights. The 
robustness of the CCE regression results may be verified by estimating models (1-3) using the pooled 
mean group (PMG) estimator by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999). 
Finally, cointegration tests are often conducted in conjunction with tests for the direction of 
Granger causality. This becomes essential if there is cointegration in models (1-3). For a cross-
sectional dependent panel, it is necessary to apply an appropriate method—in this case the Dumitrescu 
and Hurlin (2012) approach. This method is robust to cross-sectional dependence in the data and has 
a null hypothesis of homogeneous noncausality versus the alternative of heterogeneous causation in 
the specified direction (such as 𝑋 ⇒ 𝑌). 
4 Empirical Estimation Results 
Tests for cross-sectional dependence are first conducted on the individual variables in models 
(1-3). The list includes the Breusch and Pagan (1980) (BP) LM, Pesaran’s (2004) scaled (PS) LM, 
Baltagi et al.’s (2012) bias corrected scaled (BCS) LM, and Pesaran’s (2004) cross-sectional 
dependence (CD) test statistics. As Table 2 shows, the four test statistics reject the null hypothesis that 
the variables are dependent across countries (cross-sections) at the one percent level of significance. 
Table 2: Test for cross-sectional dependence, individual variables 
 Test Statistic 
Variable BP (LM) PS (LM) BCS (LM) CD 
GOV 47797.00*** 
(0.0000) 
425.3485*** 
(0.0000) 
423.5449*** 
(0.0000) 
176.9885*** 
(0.0000) 
IP 59687.60*** 
(0.0000) 
543.6644*** 
(0.0000) 
541.8609*** 
(0.0000) 
211.4611*** 
(0.0000) 
GS 51248.87*** 
(0.0000) 
459.6960*** 
(0.0000) 
457.8924*** 
(0.0000) 
205.3841*** 
(0.0000) 
KOG 113175.4*** 1075.888*** 1074.147*** 331.8246*** 
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(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GPC 90544.52*** 
(0.0000) 
850.7022*** 
(0.0000) 
848.9609*** 
(0.0000) 
215.3841*** 
(0.0000) 
FD 56471.69*** 
(0.0000) 
511.6649*** 
(0.0000) 
509.8614*** 
(0.0000) 
125.3584*** 
(0.0000) 
Lagrange multiplier and cross-sectional dependence are abbreviated as LM and CD, respectively. Parentheses include p-
values. Null hypothesis: Cross-sectional dependence (common correlation) is not present in the variable. *** When p-
value < 0.01, reject H0. 
 
We then continue to test models (1-3) for cross-sectional dependence using the Frees (1995) and 
Pesaran (2004) tests and provide the results in Table 3. Both procedures test the null hypothesis that 
the model is not dependent across the cross-sections. The estimated test statistics from Frees (1995) 
are greater than the one percent critical value for models (1-3), rejecting the null hypothesis. For the 
Pesaran (2004) test, the estimated test statistics have p-values that are less than 0.0100 for all three 
models, indicating the null hypothesis is also rejected for the Pesaran (2004) test. Thus, the presence 
of cross-sectional dependence is verified in both the individual variables and specified models (1-3). 
Table 3: Cross-sectional dependence test results, models 
  Frees (1995) a   Pesaran (2004) b  
Model  Test statistic 1% critical value  Test statistic p-value 
(1)  13.888*** 0.1660  68.613*** 0.0000 
(2)  14.693*** 0.1660  70.562*** 0.0000 
(3)  14.334*** 0.1660  128.369*** 0.0000 
H0: Model is not dependent (not correlated) across the cross-sections. 
a
 *** Reject H0 when test statistic > 1% critical value. b *** Reject H0 if the p-value < 0.0100. 
 
Faced with cross-sectional dependence in our panel dataset, we test the variables for models (1-
3) for unit roots using Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test. The test statistic and respective p-values are shown 
in Table 4. The p-values associated with the test statistics exceed 0.010 when the variables are 
measured as levels and fall below 0.010 when the variables are measured as first differences. This 
implies the levels forms of the variables are non-stationary whereas their first differences are 
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stationary. As such, we can conclude that the order of integration of all variables is 1. Therefore, 
cointegration tests may be applied to models (1-3). Additionally, we perform the Lluís Carrion‐i‐
Silvestre, Del Barrio‐Castro, and López‐Bazo (2005) test for structural breaks in the panel variables. 
The estimated results, reported in Table A1, indicate the variables are free of any structural 
changes/breaks. This supports the reliability and validity of the CIPS findings that the variables are 
integrated of order one.  
Table 4: Pesaran (2007) CIPS test results 
Variable  Test Statistic (𝑍(𝑡̅))  p-value 
GOV  -0.729  0.233 
∆ GOV  -6.380***  0.000 
IP  -0.845  0.199 
∆ IP  -7.207***  0.000 
GS  1.575  0.942 
∆ GS  -9.907***  0.000 
KOG  -0.370  0.356 
∆ KOG  -11.465***  0.000 
GPC  9.475  1.000 
∆ GPC  -2.395***  0.008 
FD  3.002  0.999 
∆ FD  -6.255***  0.000 
Deterministic term: constant and trend. Lag order selection: minimization of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). H0: Series 
is non-stationary while cross-sectional dependence is controlled for. *** When p-value < 0.010, reject H0. 
 
Table 5 provides the estimated test statistics and corresponding p-values for models (1-3) and 
shows that the p-values for the test statistics are lower than 0.01. As such, the null hypothesis of a lack 
of cointegration in models (1-3) is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. The number of 
unobserved common factors is one for models (1) and (3) and two for model (2). Cointegration can 
thus be observed to exist in the estimated models. 
Table 5: Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) cointegration test results 
Model 𝑍𝜏(𝑁) p-value 𝑍𝜙(𝑁) p-value No. of common factors 
(1) -12.908*** 0.000 -15.950*** 0.000 1 
(2) -5.628*** 0.000 -3.253*** 0.001 2 
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(3) -6.463*** 0.000 -7.244*** 0.000 1 
H0: No cointegration present in the model after controlling for cross-sectional dependence. *** When p-value < 0.010, 
reject H0. 
 
As models (1-3) are cointegrated, we continue estimating the long-run equations based on these 
models. Because our dataset is cross-sectionally dependent, we implement the CCE mean group and 
PMG estimators. The CCE and PMG estimators’ results are provided in Panels A & B, respectively, 
of Table 6. The coefficient of KOG—the proxy for globalization—is negative and significant at the 5 
percent level in the CCE estimator. By contrast, the PMG estimator shows a positive and insignificant 
coefficient on KOG. All else being equal, a 1 unit increase in the globalization measure results in a 
0.101 unit decrease in the governance indicator. This result is consistent with the framework proposed 
by Blouin, Ghosal, and Mukand (2012), as well as with the skeptical view of globalization’s impact 
on governance held by Rodrik and Subramanian (2009), Stiglitz (2010), and Krugman (2009). They 
argue that globalization increases the risk of sudden capital flight and provides governments with the 
wrong incentives, resulting in “undisciplined” governments and leading to (mis)governance. Similarly, 
Rodrik (1998) highlights that the risk of capital flight that arises due to global market integration can 
be mitigated with a large government sector. However, a large public sector can also increase the 
government’s exploitative power, resulting in poor governance quality. 
Table 6: Long-run equations (1-3), CCE and PMG estimates 
Panel A: CCE estimates    
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -0.692 
(0.814) 
0.945 
(0.781) 
0.709 
(0.702) 
KOG -0.101** 
(0.048) 
-0.066* 
(0.056) 
-0.064** 
(0.047) 
GPC 0.005** 
(0.002) 
4.26×10–5 
(0.982) 
0.001** 
(0.040) 
FD 6.376* 
(0.068) 
5.914* 
(0.058) 
4.234* 
(0.063) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.184 0.421 0.685 
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Panel B: PMG estimates    
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant 8.592** 
(0.050) 
6.365** 
(0.007) 
-5.325** 
(0.020) 
KOG 0.068 
(0.377) 
0.013 
(0.725) 
0.110** 
(0.015) 
GPC 0.014** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.030) 
0.006** 
(0.006) 
FD 9.836* 
(0.079) 
5.336* 
(0.071) 
8.477** 
(0.020) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.521 0.405 1.090 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of 
coefficient. Mean squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the 
p-value < 0.1000. 
 
GPC—per capita income—is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in both the CCE and 
PMG estimators. A US$1 increase in per capita GDP (base year = 2010) results in an average increase 
of between 0.005 and 0.014 in the governance indicator (GOV). This finding is intuitive and consistent 
with economic theory. As economic activity increases, investments to improve formal governance 
increase, and reliance on informal mechanisms decreases. As Dixit (2011) highlights, this is mainly 
because cooperation can often be efficiently sustained through personal ties and repeated interactions 
when an economy is small and localized. However, as economic development occurs, it increases the 
complexity and scale of trade, which may affect the efficiency of formal governance mechanisms 
(Dixit, 2003; Greif, 1994; J. S. Li, 2003), creating stronger incentives for public investments in 
governance institutions. In addition, undertaking comprehensive governance reform is often 
challenging for developing economies that lack administrative expertise and capital resources in terms 
of expenses and technical know-how (Rodrik, 2008). Therefore, higher GDP per capita means more 
revenue for government expenditures and other activities. This, in turn, can allow the government to 
function more efficiently, as well as achieve economies of scale and scope. 
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The coefficient of FD is also found to be positive. However, it is the only variable in the equation 
that is significant at the 10 percent level in both the CCE and PMG estimators. Ceteris paribus, when 
FD increases by 0.1 units, GOV increases between 0.64 and 0.98 units. This is consistent with the 
argument that only countries with high levels of financial development may be able to support good 
governance since financial development improves the government’s access to funds/revenue, resulting 
in more efficient operation. Similarly, our result supports Rajan and Zingales’s (2003) political 
economy argument, namely, that when political power is unequally distributed, and political decisions 
are controlled by a narrow elite, financial development can be curtailed to restrict political competitors’ 
access to finance. Therefore, improvements in financial development can lead to higher levels of 
political competition that in turn can improve the quality of institutions and governance. 
For model (2), we find the coefficient of KOG is significant in the CCE estimator at the 10 
percent level, and while its PMG counterpart is insignificant. The significant effect of KOG on IP is 
negative and slightly lower than that in model (1). The coefficient of GPC is found to be positive and 
insignificant from the CCE but negative and significant (at 5 percent level) from the PMG. This 
negative effect of GPC in model (2) is a contrast to its positive effect in model (1) The coefficient on 
FD are significant when α = 10% in both the CCE and PMG estimators. The effect of FD on IP is 
positive, and its magnitude is almost identical to that in model (1). For model (3), all three coefficients 
are statistically significant in both the CCE and PMG estimators. The coefficient of KOG is significant 
at the 5 percent level (in both estimators) but have opposing signs. The magnitude of the negative 
effect (in the CCE estimator) is lower than that of its counterpart in model (1). GPC has a positive 
effect on GS and is significant at the 5 percent level. Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of GPC’s effect 
on GS in model (3) is between some one-half (PMG) and one-fifth (CCE) its effect on GOV in model 
(1). Like its counterparts in models (1-2), FD positively affects GS, and this effect is significant at the 
10 and 5 percent levels under the CCE and PMG estimators, respectively. However, the coefficient of 
FD in model (3) is substantially lower than its counterpart in model (1). Ultimately, we find FD 
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positively affects governance, and this effect is robust to different measures of governance as well as 
different estimators. 
Table 7 provides the estimated test statistics and corresponding p-values from the Dumitrescu 
and Hurlin (2012) Granger causality tests performed on the variables from models (1-3). As seen in 
the rightmost column, the p-values are lower than 0.01000 for all causal directions except 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇔𝐺𝑂𝑉, 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶, 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇔ 𝐺𝑆, and 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆. The p-values between 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇔ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 are greater than 
0.010 but smaller than 0.050. Thus, there is feedback between these two variables at the 5 percent 
significance level. The estimated p-value for the direction 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 is also less than 0.05000, 
implying the presence of causality at the 5 percent significance level. For both 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇔ 𝐺𝑆 directions, 
the p-values are greater than 0.10000, demonstrating a lack of causality between these two variables. 
The p-value for 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 is greater than 0.05000 but less than 0.10000, indicating that causality runs 
in that direction at the 10 percent significance level. In all remaining directions, Granger causality 
exists at the 1 percent significance level. 
Table 7: Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) Granger causality test results 
 Test statistics  
Causality direction ?̅? ?̅? p-value 𝐾𝑂𝐺 ⇒ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 3.31046*** 4.58847*** 0.00000 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ⇒ 𝐾𝑂𝐺 3.54068*** 5.53972*** 0.00000 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇒ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 2.79991** 2.47884** 0.01320 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 2.74914** 2.26906** 0.02330 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 2.92181*** 2.98255*** 0.00290 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ⇒ 𝐹𝐷 3.50866*** 5.40743*** 0.00000 𝐾𝑂𝐺 ⇒ 𝐼𝑃 4.86751*** 11.0222*** 0.00000 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐾𝑂𝐺 3.66082*** 6.03616*** 0.00000 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇒ 𝐼𝑃 4.12621*** 7.95913*** 0.00000 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 2.80016** 2.47989** 0.01310 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐼𝑃 4.38912*** 9.04548*** 0.00000 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐹𝐷 3.88427*** 6.95944*** 0.00000 𝐾𝑂𝐺 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 2.85649*** 2.71265*** 0.00670 𝐺𝑆 ⇒ 𝐾𝑂𝐺 2.99336*** 3.27819*** 0.00100 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 2.56021 1.48839 0.13660 𝐺𝑆 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 2.59318 1.62463 0.10420 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 2.61741* 1.72477* 0.08460 𝐺𝑆 ⇒ 𝐹𝐷 2.96031*** 3.14161*** 0.00170 
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𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇒ 𝐾𝑂𝐺 3.28160*** 4.54996*** 0.00000 𝐾𝑂𝐺 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 4.31049*** 8.84042*** 0.00000 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐾𝑂𝐺 3.17164*** 4.01483*** 0.00000 𝐾𝑂𝐺 ⇒ 𝐹𝐷 5.64154*** 14.2205*** 0.00000 𝐹𝐷 ⇒ 𝐺𝑃𝐶 5.26401*** 12.6605*** 0.00000 𝐺𝑃𝐶 ⇒ 𝐹𝐷 4.99966*** 11.5683*** 0.00000 
Selected lag order: 2. Null hypothesis: Lack of causality in the direction. * Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.10000. ** Reject 
H0 when the p-value < 0.05000. *** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.01000. 
 
The analysis shows causality in most directions, especially from FD to the governance measures. 
As such, we are curious about the effect of governance on financial development. Accordingly, we 
estimate equations with FD as the dependent variable and each of the three governance measures in 
turn as an independent variable, along with KOG and GPC. The CCE and PMG estimates from those 
equations are provided in Panels A & B of Table 8 and show that the effect of KOG and GPC on FD 
is positive and significant in all three equations. In addition, the magnitudes of these two coefficients 
are virtually identical across all three equations. The coefficients of GOV, IP, and GS are positive in 
their respective equations under both the CCE and PMG estimators. However, only the coefficients of 
GOV and IP are significant under the CCE approach at the 10 and 5 percent significance levels, 
respectively. Ceteris paribus, the effect of a 1 unit increases in GOV, IP, and GS on FD are between 
0.001 and 0.003 units, respectively, proving that the governance indicators have a positive effect on 
financial development. 
Table 8: Impact of governance on financial development, CCE and PMG estimates 
Panel A: CCE 
estimates 
   
 Regressand   
Regressor FD FD FD 
Constant -0.046 
(0.389) 
-0.015 
(0.751) 
0.020 
(0.665) 
KOG 0.002** 
(0.005) 
0.003** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.010) 
GPC 2.14×10–5* 
(0.050) 
2.13×10–5* 
(0.082) 
2.45×10–5** 
(0.005) 
GOV 0.001* 
(0.089) 
- - 
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IP - 0.003** 
(0.044) 
- 
GS - - 6.96×10–5 
(0.951) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 0.021 0.021 0.023 
Panel B: PMG 
estimates 
   
 Regressand   
Regressor FD FD FD 
Constant -0.126** 
(0.013) 
-0.124** 
(0.010) 
-0.102** 
(0.045) 
KOG 0.003** 
(0.000) 
0.004** 
(0.000) 
0.003** 
(0.000) 
GPC 3.81×10-5** 
(0.000) 
2.94×10-5** 
(0.002) 
3.78×10-5** 
(0.000) 
GOV 0.001** 
(0.035) 
- - 
IP - 0.002* 
(0.054) 
- 
GS - - 0.003** 
(0.040) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 0.032 0.031 0.033 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of 
coefficient. Mean squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the 
p-value < 0.1000. 
 
These findings are in line with extant studies that find governance has a positive effect on 
financial development (see, for example, Law & Azman-Saini, 2012b; Le et al., 2015). Improved 
governance quality implies better enforcement of contractual and property rights, an effective legal 
system, and efficient financial regulation. These improvements create an environment that promotes 
rapid financial development. 
5 Robustness Checks 
Table 9 provides the estimates of long-run equations (1-3) for four country groups by income 
levels in 2013, as classified by the World Bank (Table A6 shows the composition of countries 
belonging to each group). As shown, the financial development effect on governance is seen only in 
upper-middle- and high-income economies. Furthermore, the positive impact of financial development 
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on governance indicators is greater for upper-middle-income countries than high-income countries 
(Panels C and D). In low- and lower-middle-income countries, the effect of financial development is 
insignificant, with one exception—financial development worsens investment profiles in lower-
middle-income economies (Panel B). 
The results indicate the relationship between financial development and governance depends on 
a country’s level of development. Financial development leads to improvements in governance in 
countries with higher levels of income (and development). These results underscore the importance of 
the level of development in supporting good governance. Countries with lower GDP per capita may 
not have sufficient resources to support and improve their governance structures (Fosu, Bates, & 
Hoeffler, 2006). Moreover, the demand for good governance is likely to be lower at lower levels of 
development, as most transactions are still managed through personal ties and repeated transactions 
(Law & Azman-Saini, 2012). This is also in accordance with the median voter hypothesis (Milanovic, 
2000). In countries with low per capita income, the poor median voter is more concerned about making 
“ends meet” and less concerned about the quality of institutions. However, at higher levels of economic 
development (i.e., higher per capita income), the median voter is better off and is now more aware of 
or concerned about the quality of institutions and governance. Rising income inequality that is often 
associated with growth—the Kuznets hypothesis—is also cited as a possible reason for worsening 
governance at low levels of development, while improving it at high levels of development when 
inequality declines (Chong & Calderón, 2000). As such, the positive effects on governance quality of 
improvement in the level of financial development only appear to kick in at the later stages of economic 
development. 
Table 9: Long-run equations (1-3) by country groups of income level, CCE estimates 
Panel A: Low-income countries (GDP Per capita ≤$995) 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant 2.129 
(0.718) 
-4.102 
(0.163) 
0.806 
(0.788) 
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KOG -0.064 
(0.304) 
-0.004 
(0.962) 
-0.005 
(0.903) 
GPC 0.038** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.630) 
0.015** 
(0.002) 
FD 11.674 
(0.446) 
-9.410 
(0.120) 
1.417 
(0.863) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.313 0.658 0.701 
Panel B: Lower middle-income countries (GDP Per capita ≥$996 and ≤$3,945) 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -0.533 
(0.894) 
2.298 
(0.739) 
-1.681 
(0.373) 
KOG -0.041 
(0.627) 
0.055 
(0.573) 
-0.053 
(0.215) 
GPC 0.004 
(0.357) 
-0.005 
(0.573) 
1.94×10-4 
(0.911) 
FD 11.978 
(0.346) 
-15.754* 
(0.057) 
3.112 
(0.560) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.396 0.473 0.752 
Panel C: Upper middle-income countries (GDP Per capita ≥$3,946 and ≤$12,195) 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -4.083 
(0.732) 
-2.349 
(0.683) 
-1.188 
(0.572) 
KOG -0.124 
(0.315) 
-0.040 
(0.443) 
-0.101** 
(0.037) 
GPC 0.002 
(0.228) 
0.001 
(0.105) 
0.001 
(0.120) 
FD 13.602* 
(0.089) 
6.202** 
(0.045) 
6.470* 
(0.056) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.033 0.464 0.800 
Panel D: High-income countries (GDP Per capita ≥$12,196) 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -4.608 
(0.596) 
-0.551 
(0.824) 
-3.528 
(0.347) 
KOG 0.138 
(0.308) 
-0.075* 
(0.055) 
0.099 
(0.183) 
GPC 2.59×10-4 
(0.349) 
1.44×10-4** 
(0.022) 
-4.52×10-5 
(0.715) 
FD 7.978** 
(0.042) 
2.722* 
(0.053) 
3.611* 
(0.077) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 0.785 0.594 0.488 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of 
coefficient. Mean squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the 
p-value < 0.1000. 
Table 10 shows the impact of financial development on governance indicators in countries 
grouped by level of globalization (Table A7 shows the composition of countries belonging to each 
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group). The groups of economies are classified by quartiles of KOG values. For KOG quartile 1 (Panel 
A, Table 10), the effects of FD on GOV, IP, and GS are positive, but none are statistically significant. 
For KOG quartile 2 (Panel B, Table 10), FD has negative coefficients for all three regressands. 
However, the negative coefficient of FD is only significant when the regressand is IP. Finally, for 
quartiles 3 and 4 of KOG in Panels C and D, FD has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
all three governance indicators and GOV and GS on FD. This provides further support for our finding 
that financial development can improve governance. In addition, the findings in Table 10 are virtually 
identical to those in Table 9, indicating the governance improving effect of financial development is 
operative only at high levels of income and globalization. One possible explanation is that a country 
that is more integrated in the world economy is at higher risk of facing capital flight due to poor 
governance. Hence, higher levels of globalization may work as a catalyst to trigger institutional and 
governance reforms in response to increased financial development (Mishkin, 2009). Possible channels 
of such reforms may include spillover of ideas, information, and technology, as well as improving 
citizens’ affluence as the economy commits fully to integrating with the rest of the world (Shahbaz, 
Shafiullah, & Mahalik, 2019). In addition, a higher level of globalization involves interdependence 
between nations, culminating in alignment of economic policy and institutional reforms (Waltz, 1999). 
We further test the sensitivity of our results by employing two different measures of financial 
development that are commonly used in the literature. These two measures are deposit money bank 
assets to (deposit money + central) bank assets (%) and private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(%); both of these are classified as measures of financial depth (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 
1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2010; Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2012). These 
measures have been widely used in the literature as proxies for financial development (see, e.g., Beck, 
Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; King & Levine, 1993a; King & 
Levine, 1993b). The results of this exercise are provided in Appendix Tables A2, A3, and A4. These 
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results are qualitatively similar to those reported using Svirydzenka’s (2016) financial development 
index. 
For instance, the long-run estimates in Table A2 reveal that both alternative measures of financial 
development positively affect governance quality, consistent with our earlier findings reported in Table 
6. Further, Table A3 confirms the bidirectional causal relationship between financial development and 
governance quality when we use the additional financial development measures. As such, the results 
in Table A3 indicate that bank assets to (deposit money + central) bank assets (%) and private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP (%) both cause improvements in governance quality. Last, Table A4 
confirms that improvements in governance quality can also lead to improvements in the levels of the 
two alternative financial development measures; these results are robust to using all three measures of 
governance. 
Table 10: Long-run equations (1-3) by country groups of globalization level, CCE estimates 
Panel A: KOG quartile 1 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -1.787 
(0.647) 
-1.691 
(0.142) 
0.826 
(0.703) 
KOG -0.086 
(0.147) 
-0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.030 
(0.430) 
GPC 0.018** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.143) 
FD 10.983 
(0.433) 
2.663 
(0.750) 
8.288 
(0.249) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.354 0.709 0.723 
Panel B: KOG quartile 2 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -0.395 
(0.918) 
3.334 
(0.518) 
-1.934 
(0.207) 
KOG 0.036 
(0.632) 
0.061 
(0.205) 
-0.041 
(0.290) 
GPC 0.005** 
(0.048) 
-0.004 
(0.293) 
0.002 
(0.118) 
FD 12.371 
(0.122) 
-9.402* 
(0.096) 
2.906 
(0.507) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.293 0.490 0.738 
Panel C: KOG quartile 3 
 Regressand   
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Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -18.455** 
(0.004) 
-3.835 
(0.327) 
-3.805 
(0.352) 
KOG -0.039 
(0.722) 
0.021 
(0.611) 
9.35×10-4 
(0.985) 
GPC -1.56×10-4 
(0.843) 
4.49×10-4 
(0.335) 
-2.82×10-4 
(0.513) 
FD 12.157** 
(0.037) 
4.320** 
(0.048) 
7.135** 
(0.033) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 0.999 0.447 0.505 
 
   
 
   
Panel D: KOG quartile 4 
 Regressand   
Regressor GOV IP GS 
Constant -3.084 
(0.640) 
0.310 
(0.929) 
2.140 
(0.596) 
KOG -0.057 
(0.710) 
-0.096* 
(0.073) 
0.004 
(0.958) 
GPC 3.31×10-4* 
(0.083) 
2.34×10-4** 
(0.007) 
1.85×10-4* 
(0.066) 
FD 5.037* 
(0.083) 
2.748* 
(0.085) 
2.629* 
(0.086) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 0.929 0.525 0.592 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of coefficient. Mean 
squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.1000. 
6 Conclusion 
This study is the first attempt to conduct a cross-country analysis of the bidirectional causality 
between financial development and governance. Further, it tests whether the relationship between 
financial development and governance varies by level of development and government openness, 
which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been explored in extant literature. The tests for 
bidirectional causality between financial development and governance are conducted using cross-
sectional dependent panel data of 101 countries spanning more than 30 years. Using econometric 
methods robust to cross-sectional dependence, we find the specified models to be cointegrated. Long-
run equation estimates show that financial development positively affects governance and is robust to 
different measures of governance quality. Further analysis shows governance quality positively affects 
financial development, which is consistent with extant literature. The Granger causality tests 
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demonstrate bidirectional causality between financial development and the different governance 
measures. Last, the impact of financial development is dependent on a country’s level of economic 
development and economic openness. 
The empirical findings highlight the pivotal role economic development plays through the 
financial sector in introducing governance reforms. The improvements in governance, in turn, 
accelerate financial sector development. As such, there can be a symbiotic, as well as synergistic, 
relationship among good governance, growth, and economic development. Our results have important 
policy implications, especially for developing countries, as their financial systems tend to be 
underdeveloped and well below the global finance frontier. First, governance and institutional reforms 
are not prerequisites for financial development. However, financial development can drive governance 
reforms because of governments’ ease of access to finance for undertaking such reforms.  
Second, improving financial development first may prevent a backlash to institutional and 
governance reforms, as politicians will face more competition and be less likely to reverse these 
reforms. A strong financial system will limit relationship banking, which favors loans to friends and 
relatives at the expense of more productive and profitable commercial lending. As a result, competition 
in the political arena will improve as politicians see a decline in their de-facto political power. Last, to 
capitalize further on the positive benefits accruing from financial development, countries should focus 
on improving their economic and financial liberalization in tandem. Economic and financial 
liberalization, together with financial development, may trigger far-reaching and deep-rooted 
institutional and governance reforms that can eventually set a low-income country on a high-growth 
trajectory. 
Although our study highlights a robust link between financial development and good governance 
at the macro level, the analysis can be extended using micro-data or by conducting a survey to provide 
further insights into the financial development and governance nexus. Another possible extension of 
 30 
our work at the micro-level is to study how the availability of micro-credit improves the level of 
governance, especially in rural areas. Further, our data spans a period of only 30 years, hence limiting 
our ability to introduce non-linearities in analyzing the association between financial development and 
the quality of governance. With the availability of more data, future studies can extend the analysis to 
consider any non-linearities in the relationship. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Lluís Carrion‐i‐Silvestre et al. (2005) panel structural break test 
 
Fixed number of breaks (H0: m=0 vs HA: 
m=1) ** 
 Unknown number of breaks (H0: m=0 vs HA: 
m=?) **  
Variable Test statistic (supF) Critical value (5%) 
 
Test statistic (WDmax) Critical value (5%) 
Break 
date 
GOV 6.8965517 11.470000  6.8965517 12.810000 N/A 
IP 6.8571429 11.470000  6.8571429 12.810000 N/A 
GS 6.8965517 11.470000  6.8965517 12.810000 N/A 
KOG 1.7419355 11.470000  1.7419355 12.810000 N/A 
GPC 3.4666667 11.470000  3.4666667 12.810000 N/A 
FD 6.8965517 11.470000  6.8965517 12.810000 N/A 
** Reject the respective H0: series contains a unit root process without the specified no. of breaks (m), if test statistic > critical value at 
the 5% level. 
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Table A2: Long-run equations (1-3), alternative financial development measures, CCE estimates 
 Regressand      
Regressor GOV IP GS GOV IP GS 
Constant -3.062 
(0.436) 
16.393* 
(0.053) 
-1.044 
(0.648) 
-2.546 
(0.531) 
-3.703 
(0.579) 
0.141 
(0.947) 
KOG 0.020 
(0.898) 
-0.245 
(0.297) 
-0.037 
(0.671) 
-0.002 
(0.989) 
-0.027 
(0.828) 
-0.045 
(0.572) 
GPC 3.36×10-4* 
(0.056) 
7.22×10-5 
(0.839) 
1.28×10-4 
(0.189) 
-3.51×10-4** 
(0.039) 
2.63×10-4 
(0.744) 
-1.52×10-4* 
(0.086) 
DEPOSIT 
MONEY BANK 
ASSETS to 
(DEPOSIT 
MONEY + 
CENTRAL) 
BANK ASSETS 
(%) 
0.123* 
(0.076) 
0.264** 
(0.045) 
0.076** 
(0.047) - - - 
PRIVATE 
CREDIT BY 
DEPOSIT 
MONEY BANKS 
to GDP (%) 
- - - 0.112** 
(0.046) 
0.240** 
(0.011) 
0.063** 
(0.034) 
√𝑀𝑆𝐸 1.136 0.280 0.603 1.128 0.000 0.639 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of coefficient. Mean 
squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.1000. 
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Table A3: Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) Granger causality test results, alternative financial 
development measures 
 Test statistics  
Causality direction ?̅? ?̅? p-value 𝐷𝐸𝑃 ⇒ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 3.53138*** 5.29631*** 0.0000 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ⇒ 𝐷𝐸𝑃 4.13937*** 7.75000*** 0.0000 𝐷𝐸𝑃 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 3.78170*** 6.30653*** 0.0000 𝐺𝑆 ⇒ 𝐷𝐸𝑃 3.35926*** 4.60165*** 0.0000 𝐷𝐸𝑃 ⇒ 𝐼𝑃 3.44808*** 4.96011*** 0.0000 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝐷𝐸𝑃 4.38433*** 8.73862*** 0.0000 𝑃𝑅𝐼 ⇒ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 3.36195*** 4.60415*** 0.0000 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ⇒ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 4.11950*** 7.65858*** 0.0000 𝑃𝑅𝐼 ⇒ 𝐺𝑆 3.87948*** 6.69082*** 0.0000 𝐺𝑆 ⇒ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 3.19229*** 3.92009*** 0.0000 𝑃𝑅𝐼 ⇒ 𝐼𝑃 3.38052*** 4.67905*** 0.0000 𝐼𝑃 ⇒ 𝑃𝑅𝐼 4.16866*** 7.85678*** 0.0000 
Selected lag order: 2. Null hypothesis: Lack of causality in the direction. *** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.01000. DEP stands for 
deposit money bank assets to (deposit money + central) bank assets (%). PRI stands for private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(%). 
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Table A4: Impact of governance on alternative financial development measures, CCE estimates 
 Regressand      
Regressor DEP DEP DEP PRI PRI PRI 
Constant 15.188 
(0.277) 
18.838 
(0.181) 
5.890 
(0.705) 
18.209 
(0.324) 
20.924 
(0.195) 
12.234 
(0.504) 
KOG -0.661* 
(0.069) 
-0.290 
(0.380) 
-0.380 
(0.333) 
-0.800 
(0.287) 
-0.450 
(0.516) 
-0.589 
(0.398) 
GPC -0.001** 
(0.018) 
-0.002** 
(0.003) 
-0.001** 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.138) 
-0.001* 
(0.081) 
-0.001* 
(0.070) 
GOV 0.937** 
(0.004) 
- - 0.936* 
(0.053) 
- - 
IP - 1.522** 
(0.005) 
- - 2.284** 
(0.043) 
- 
GS - - 1.523** 
(0.001) 
- - 1.777** 
(0.031) √𝑀𝑆𝐸 5.547 5.488 5.636 6.681 6.450 6.380 
The coefficients are cross-sectional averages. Parentheses indicate p-values. Null hypothesis: insignificant effect of 
coefficient. Mean squared error (σ2) is abbreviated as MSE. ** Reject H0 when the p-value < 0.0500. * Reject H0 when the 
p-value < 0.1000.DEP stands for deposit money bank assets to (deposit money + central) bank assets (%). PRI stands for private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP (%). 
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Table A5: List of countries in the sample 
 
Albania Ecuador Luxembourg Senegal 
Algeria Egypt Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Argentina El Salvador Malawi Singapore 
Australia Ethiopia Malaysia South Africa 
Austria Finland Mali South Korea 
Bahamas France Malta Spain 
Bahrain Gabon Mexico Sudan 
Bangladesh Gambia Mongolia Suriname 
Belgium Germany Morocco Sweden 
Bolivia Ghana Mozambique Switzerland 
Botswana Greece Myanmar Thailand 
Brazil Guatemala Netherlands Togo 
Brunei Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Trinidad & Tobago 
Bulgaria Guyana Nicaragua Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Honduras Niger Turkey 
Cameroon Iceland Nigeria UAE 
Canada India Norway Uganda 
Chile Indonesia Oman United Kingdom 
China Iran Pakistan United States 
Colombia Ireland Panama Uruguay 
Congo Israel Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Costa Rica Italy Paraguay Vietnam 
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Peru Zambia 
Cyprus Japan Philippines  
Denmark Jordan Portugal  
Dominican Republic Kenya Saudi Arabia  
 
 
 45 
Table A6: List of Countries According to World Bank Income Classification 
Low-income Lower-middle-income Upper-middle-income High-income 
Bangladesh Bolivia Albania Australia Saudi Arabia 
Burkina Faso Cameroon Algeria Austria Singapore 
Ethiopia Congo Argentina Bahamas South Korea 
Gambia Cote d'Ivoire Botswana Bahrain Spain 
Guinea-Bissau Egypt Brazil Belgium Sweden 
Madagascar El Salvador Bulgaria Brunei Switzerland 
Malawi Ghana China Canada Trinidad & Tobago 
Mali Guatemala Colombia Chile UAE 
Mozambique Guyana Costa Rica Cyprus United Kingdom 
Niger Honduras Dominican Republic Denmark United States 
Sierra Leone India Ecuador Finland Uruguay 
Togo Indonesia Gabon France Venezuela 
Uganda Kenya Iran Germany  
 
Mongolia Jamaica Greece  
 
Morocco Jordan Iceland  
 
Myanmar Malaysia Ireland  
 
Nicaragua Mexico Israel  
 
Nigeria Panama Italy  
 
Pakistan Peru Japan  
 
Papua New Guinea South Africa Luxembourg  
 
Paraguay Suriname Malta  
 
Philippines Thailand Netherlands  
 
Senegal Tunisia New Zealand  
 
Sudan Turkey Norway  
 
Vietnam 
 
Oman  
 
Zambia 
 
Portugal  
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Table A7: List of Countries According to Quartiles of KOF Globalization Index 
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
Albania Algeria Argentina Australia 
Bangladesh Bahamas Bahrain Austria 
Burkina Faso Bolivia Brazil Belgium 
Cameroon Botswana Brunei Canada 
Congo China Bulgaria Denmark 
Cote d'Ivoire Colombia Chile Finland 
Ethiopia Dominican Republic Costa Rica France 
Guinea-Bissau Ecuador Cyprus Germany 
India Egypt Israel Greece 
Iran El Salvador Jamaica Iceland 
Kenya Gabon Japan Ireland 
Madagascar Gambia Jordan Italy 
Malawi Ghana Malta Luxembourg 
Mali Guatemala Mexico Malaysia 
Mongolia Guyana Oman Netherlands 
Mozambique Honduras Panama New Zealand 
Myanmar Indonesia Saudi Arabia Norway 
Niger Morocco South Africa Portugal 
Pakistan Nicaragua South Korea Singapore 
Papua New 
Guinea Nigeria Thailand Spain 
Sierra Leone Paraguay Trinidad & Tobago Sweden 
Sudan Peru Tunisia Switzerland 
Suriname Philippines Turkey UAE 
Togo Senegal Uruguay United Kingdom 
Uganda Zambia Venezuela United States 
Vietnam 
   
 
 
 
